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Abstract: 
 
Corporate capital financing decisions are an integral part of overall corporate strategy. This study 
analyses the effect of environmental performance and disclosure on the capital structure of U.S. 
firms in the electric utility industry.  The hypothesized relationships account for endogeneity in 
the three factors of strategy and are estimated using a simultaneous equations model.  Our results 
suggest that firms with lower toxics emissions exhibit higher leverage and voluntary disclosure 
and that leverage is negatively associated with disclosure.  
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1.  Introduction 
Capital structure decisions are fundamental for the firm’s financial strategy and have 
important implications for risk-taking and investment behavior of the firm, research and 
development, innovation, competition, costs, and relationships with non-financial stakeholders 
such as customers and employees.1 In practice, capital structure decisions and corporate strategy 
are interrelated (Parsons and Titman, 2008) and the question of how to finance the firm should 
support and be consistent with its long-term strategy (Andrews, 1980; Barton and Gordon, 1987). 
Parsons and Titman (2008) argue that empirical studies that attempt to shed light on the 
connection between capital structure and a firm’s corporate strategy potentially suffer from 
endogeneity problems. For example, studies of the effect of debt on a firm’s sales and market 
share need to also incorporate the effect of shocks to sales on observed debt ratios (Opler and 
Titman, 1994; Zingales, 1998; Parsons and Titman, 2008).  
In the environmental management literature, Al-Tuwarijri et al. (2004) argue that 
environmental strategy, financial performance, and environmental reporting transparency must 
be examined simultaneously. They propose a framework that explicitly treats these variables as 
endogenous variables jointly determined by the firm’s strategic management process.  
The purpose of our study is to analyze the relationship between environmental 
performance, voluntary environmental disclosure, and capital structure measured as leverage.  
Our model reflects theoretical literature and empirical support for the contention that these 
factors are influenced by a complex strategic relationship.  Specifically, we hypothesize that 
environmental performance has a significant association with both leverage and voluntary 
                                                          
1
 See for example Titman (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Hall et al.(1990), Bronars and Deere(1991), Opler 
and Titman (1994), Chevalier (1995), Kale and Noe (1995), Zingales (1998), Khanna and Tice (2000), Myers 
(2001), Campello (2002), Mauer and Sarkar (2005). 
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environmental disclosures.  We also hypothesize that there is a significant relationship between 
disclosure and leverage in that disclosure affects debt capacity and equity financing, and leverage 
requires disclosure in order to reduce agency and information asymmetry costs. 
Environmental performance may impact leverage through an increase on firms’ risk. The 
trade-off theory suggests that firms with volatile cash flows utilize less debt financing in the 
capital structure in order to avoid potential bankruptcy costs.  Poor environmental performance 
also implies uncertainty of future cash flows relating to potential regulatory changes and 
potential cleanup costs.  These contingent liabilities are not necessarily reflected in the liabilities 
recorded by firms due to the discretionary choice allowed by accounting rules (Cormier and 
Magnan, 1997).  However, previous studies have shown that managers and stakeholders consider 
these to be undisclosed liabilities when estimating firm value (Barth and McNichols, 1994; 
Clarkson and Li, 2004).  Therefore, firms with poor environmental performance should have 
lower disclosed leverage relative to their better performing peers. 
In addition to environmental performance, our model introduces environmental disclosure to 
determine the impact of the firm’s environmental strategy on leverage. Finance theory suggests 
that agency costs of debt are higher for firms with a larger proportion of debt in the capital 
structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the monitoring demand for information increases as 
firm debt increases (Leftwich, 1981). Sengupta (1998) provides evidence that firms with higher 
quality disclosure benefit from a lower cost of debt. Therefore, environmental disclosure may be 
associated with higher leverage.  
 A competing argument is that disclosure of environmental performance is likely to provide 
additional information that allows equity investors to better estimate the firm’s future cash flows 
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and reduce uncertainty. Several studies in the accounting literature show that disclosure quality 
has an impact on the cost of equity capital that, in turn, reduces estimation or information risk 
(e.g. Barry and Brown, 1985; Coles et al., 1995; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000, Lambert et al., 2007). Following this argument, environmental disclosure may 
be associated with more reliance on equity financing and lower leverage. 
For a sample of electric utility companies, our results show that poor environmental 
performance has a significant and negative impact on leverage and disclosure when controlling 
for endogeneity.  The results also show a negative relationship between environmental disclosure 
and leverage.  While we could expect disclosure to play a role in decreasing agency costs of debt 
and increase debt capacity, our results suggest that the reduction in estimation or information risk 
and consequential decrease in the cost of equity may contribute to higher equity financing. This 
result may also be explained by the fact that our disclosure variable is based on the release of 
discretionary environmental reports that may be targeted to the equity investors of companies. 
This study contributes to the accounting and finance literature in that it extends the work of 
Sharfman and Fernando (2008) by including the effects of disclosure in addition to the effects of 
environmental performance on leverage and by incorporating simultaneity of the explanatory 
variables in the model.  Our analysis introduces the Clarkson et al. (2008) measure of voluntary 
environmental disclosure as a more detailed and comprehensive measure than has been 
previously used in much of the economics, finance, or management literature.  The analysis also 
incorporates seven years of data.  This provides some assurance that our results are not unduly 
influenced by events of a single year or small set of years.  Our results provide evidence that 
environmental performance affects both environmental disclosure and leverage, and leverage is 
associated with environmental disclosure.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we expand on the relevant 
literature and formally present our hypotheses. In Section 3, we present the empirical design and 
Section 4 we discuss our sample and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents our results and our 
conclusions are discussed in Section 6.  
2.  Hypothesis Development 
The theory of the capital structure of firms is generally framed in terms of agency 
conflicts, asymmetric information, tax benefits, bankruptcy costs, or behavioral considerations. 
Within this theoretical context, we next discuss how environmental performance and disclosure 
may impact leverage.   
Environmental Performance 
Poor environmental performance is associated with latent environmental liabilities and 
potential future lawsuits related to accidental spills and other uncontrollable events (Barth and 
McNichols, 1994).  Firm’s with higher levels of pollution emissions are also more likely to see 
their operations and financial performance affected by changes in environmental legislation and 
regulation, due to high relative compliance costs. Poor environmental performance is also 
associated with inefficiencies in the manufacturing process (Nehrt, 1996) and less innovation and 
product differentiation (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Reinhardt, 1998).  Therefore, poor 
environmental performance may increase the uncertainty of the future cash flows of the 
company.  
According to the trade-off theory, higher risk should be associated with less debt, because 
future cash flows may not be high enough to repay the debt. This potential bankruptcy cost 
increases the cost of debt and reduces the firm’s ability to raise debt capital (Kraus and 
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Litzenberger, 1973).  Uncertainty in future cash flows also reduces the probability that tax 
shields will be fully utilized through consistently positive taxable income, thereby reducing the 
tax benefit of debt financing (Frank and Goyal, 2009).   
Several studies investigate the impact of environmental risk and performance on the cost 
of equity and on the cost of debt. For example, Garber and Hammitt (1998) examined the effect 
of Superfund liabilities on the costs of equity, based on the capital asset pricing model and beta, 
and found a significant positive relationship for large firms. Connors and Gao (2009) find that 
firms with high levels of Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) emissions have higher cost of equity 
capital.  Sharfman and Fernando (2008) found a positive and significant relationship between 
environmental risk management and the cost of equity, but their results show that the cost of debt 
increases with environmental risk management. They attribute this increase to an increase in debt 
financing in the capital structure of the firm. Conversely, Schneider (2010) finds that the cost of 
debt increases with poor environmental performance measured as TRI emissions. He explains 
that poor environmental performance represents potential liabilities related to compliance and 
clean-up costs due to increasingly strict environmental laws and regulations.  These potential 
liabilities may entail future fixed payments which entail a risk of insolvency. 
Another explanation of the effect of environmental performance on leverage is the view 
that poor relative environmental performance proxies for latent environmental liabilities which 
affects the debt capacity of firms (Barth and McNichols, 1994).  Rogers (2005) defines 
environmental liabilities as “probable and measurable estimates of future environmental cleanup, 
closure, and disposal costs.”  Some environmental liabilities result from pollution remediation 
laws such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA or Superfund).  SEC's Regulation S-K mandates that all companies publicly traded on 
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U.S. stock exchanges disclose significant corporate environmental liabilities and debt exposure 
in incidences of violation of U.S. environmental laws. Superfund sites information and 
disclosures regarding compliance investigations and litigation are made publicly available by the 
EPA.  Financial statement reporting requirements for environmental liabilities fall under the 
rules of SFAS No. 5, which requires that contingent liabilities be booked when it is probable that 
the liability will arise and the amount can be reasonably estimated. The ultimate loss to an entity 
from environmental liabilities is contingent on the outcome of future events which causes 
considerable estimation error (Ulph and Valentini, 2004). In the context of this uncertainty, 
accounting standards provide considerable latitude and discretion regarding disclosure and 
recognition of contingent liabilities (Rogers, 2009). The general result is that liabilities are 
unrecorded due to estimation difficulties or because the dollar values are considered to be 
immaterial. 
Even though environmental liabilities are not fully recorded or disclosed in the financial 
statements of companies, they may be accounted for by the stakeholders. Several studies in the 
accounting literature find that environmental liabilities have market valuation implications not 
reflected in book values (Barth and McNichols, 1994; Cormier and Magnan, 1997; Campbell et 
al., 1998; Clarkson and Li, 2004). The estimation risk associated with contingent Superfund 
liability estimates is particularly important to valuation (Barry and Brown, 1985; Coles and 
Loewenstein, 1988; Clarkson and Thompson, 1990; Botosan 1997). Thus the combination of 
uncertain future outcomes and accounting rules relating to contingent liabilities may result in 
possibly substantial unrecorded environmental liabilities. However, it has been shown that 
stakeholders and management recognize and adjust capital structure choices accordingly.  
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All else equal, we expect firms with better environmental performance to carry more debt 
in their capital structure than their poorly performing peers. Formally, our first hypothesis is 
stated as follows:  
Hypothesis 1:  Firms with better environmental performance maintain a capital structures 
with higher leverage than those with poor environmental performance. 
Clarkson et al. (2008) find support for the prediction that good environmental performers 
will provide more environmental information to the market in the form of substantive voluntary 
environmental reports.  Delmas and Blass (2010) find contradictory results to those in Clarkson 
et al. (2008).  However, their sample size is relatively small and they use a substantially less 
detailed measure of disclosure. The Clarkson et al. (2008) results provide empirical support for 
disclosure theory which argues that companies with better performance have more incentives to 
disclose in order to differentiate themselves from poorer performers (Dye, 1985; Verrechia, 
1983). Consistent with this theory, our second hypothesis is the following: 
Hypothesis 2:  Firms with better environmental performance provide more voluntary 
environmental disclosures than those with poor environmental performance. 
Environmental Disclosure  
Highly leveraged firms have higher agency costs of debt and incur more monitoring costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In order to manage agency and monitoring costs, firms with high 
leverage will voluntarily disclose more information (Fama and Miller, 1972; Alsaeed, 2006). 
 Leftwich (1981) also hypothesizes that monitoring demand for information increases as a 
firm’s debt increases, but their empirical results do not show a higher reporting frequency for 
companies with higher leverage. Schipper (1981) discusses the Leftwich (1981) results.  She 
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argues that agency conflicts between bondholders and stockholders can be resolved by explicit 
contracts, and as such, leverage and frequency of reporting will not necessarily show a positive 
relationship. 
Malone et al. (1993) and Hossain et al. (1994) empirically identified leverage as a factor 
with a positive association with the extent of voluntary disclosure. However, several other papers 
have not found a significant relationship between leverage and disclosure (Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987; Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Hossain et al., 1995; Raffournier, 
1995).  
In a study of disclosure practices across different countries, Zazerski (1996) finds a 
negative relationship between leverage and disclosure and concludes that firms with more debt 
are likely to disclose less public information. He argues that companies with higher debt ratios 
share more private information with creditors in countries with high uncertainty avoidance and 
where firms developed special banking relationships. Conversely, there is an increased demand 
for public information from companies with higher level of equity. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that demand for financial reporting and disclosure arises 
from information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors. 
Information asymmetry results from managers having superior information relative to investors 
regarding the firm’s future prospects (Milgrom, 1981; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), equity and debt is costly for companies that cannot 
resolve information asymmetry. Other studies provide evidence that higher disclosure quality 
reduces information asymmetry, increases the certainty of future returns and lowers transaction 
costs for investors (Lev, 1988; Lang and Lundholm, 2000).  
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Forecasting risk is also higher for firms with lower disclosure (Barry and Brown, 1986). 
Firms with more disclosure, and hence lower information risk, are more likely to have a lower 
cost of capital than firms with a low level of disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Several studies 
provide evidence that disclosure quality has an impact on the cost of equity capital (e.g. Barry 
and Brown, 1985; Coles et al., 1995; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Botoson, 1997; Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000; Lambert et al., 2007). Therefore, disclosure may increase the level of equity 
financing.  
There is also evidence that managers who anticipate equity financing have incentives to 
provide voluntary disclosure and reduce the information asymmetry problem (Healy and Palepu, 
1993, 1995). For example, Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that firms issuing securities in the 
current or future periods benefit from higher analysts’ ratings. Lang and Lundholm (2000) find 
that there is a significant increase in disclosure beginning six months before for firms making 
equity offerings.  
We study the impact of environmental performance and disclosure on leverage. As we 
have discussed, leverage may be a determinant of voluntary disclosure, as firms may need to 
resolve asymmetric information and agency problems with the stakeholders. However, following 
the argument that managers who anticipate external financing have incentives to provide 
voluntary disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 1993, 1995) and the aforementioned effects of 
disclosure on the cost of equity capital, we could also expect higher levels of disclosure for firms 
that rely on external financing. Therefore, the direction of causality between leverage and 
environmental disclosure is not clear.  
Given the conflicting theories and evidence relating to the effect of disclosure on debt 
capacity (numerator) and on equity financing (denominator) components of leverage, there is no 
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consensus expectation for the sign of the relationship either. Therefore we propose the following 
non-directional hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a significant relationship between leverage and the level of 
environmental disclosure. 
3.  Empirical Design 
Parsons and Titman (2008) consider that endogeneity is one of the biggest challenges in 
empirical corporate finance research. Statistically, endogeneity means that the model’s errors are 
not random because they are partially predictable from information contained in the explanatory 
variables. Regression models may be misspecified in a way that makes identifying a causal effect 
between two economic variables difficult. 
Al-Tuwarijri et al. (2004) show that statistical mishandling of endogeneity affected prior 
research into the relationship between environmental disclosure, environmental performance and 
economic performance. They provide analyses using simultaneous equations models in various 
forms to show that these factors are jointly determined and have a positive relationship. 
Healey and Palepu (2001) also point out potential endogeneity bias in disclosure studies. 
As an example, they mention that firms with the highest disclosure ratings tend to also have high 
contemporaneous earnings performance (Lang and Lundholm, 1993) and that this phenomenon 
may be caused by a self-selection bias. In other words, firms may increase disclosure when they 
have better performance.  
 Our theoretical discussions lead us to the conclusion that our analysis of the effects of 
disclosure and environmental performance on leverage must account for the possible effect of 
endogeneity. We posit that managers jointly determine leverage, environmental performance and 
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environmental disclosure. Following Al-Tuwarijri et al. (2004) we specify leverage as a function 
of environmental disclosure and performance, and environmental disclosure as a function of 
leverage and environmental performance. Our model takes the following structural form: 
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Equation (1) in our model follows the standard literature in capital structure. Harris and 
Raviv (1991), and more recently Frank and Goyal (2010), surveyed the literature and propose 
factors that explain leverage. We control for the proportion of fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, 
growth opportunities, profitability and firm size.  
Equation (2) is based on the model proposed in Clarkson et al. (2008). The control 
variables included in the model have been documented to be determinants of voluntary 
disclosures in the disclosure literature. In Table 1 we present the description of the variables used 
in both equations.  
Leverage and Environmental Variables 
Leverage 
Leverage is computed as total debt over the sum of total debt, market value of equity and 
liquidating value of preferred stock. We follow Welch (2008), who argues that in the leverage 
ratios financial debt should be divided by financial capital and not total assets. 
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Environmental Performance  
Consistent with several prior studies (for example, Clarkson et al., 2008; King and Lenox, 2002; 
Konar and Cohen, 2001) we measure environmental performance as annual Toxics Release 
Inventory (TRI) emissions in pounds scaled by U.S. sales.  A higher value on this variable 
indicates poorer environmental performance.  For the purposes of this study, annual emissions 
have been aggregated across chemicals and across the various methods of release. We have 
aggregated the TRI reports to the parent company level.  Facility ownership has been determined 
by the review of SEC filed forms 10-K, corporate and facility websites, and through public 
announcements of acquisitions and disposals of subsidiaries and facilities. 
Environmental Disclosure  
Our measure of environmental disclosure is the index proposed in Clarkson et al. (2008) to 
assess the discretionary disclosures about environmental policies, performance and corporate 
governance and initiatives in environmental reports. This index is based on the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) Sustainability Guidelines of 2002.  We include the Clarkson index as three 
separate measures of disclosure.  Consistent with Clarkson et al. (2008), we utilize a measure of 
total disclosures.  We also separate total disclosures in to “hard” disclosures and “soft” 
disclosure in accordance with Clarkson et al. (2008) methodology.  Clarkson et al. (2008) define 
“hard” disclosures as those that are objective, not easily mimicked, and potentially litigable.  The 
authors define “soft” disclosures as less verifiable, general commitments to environmental 
performance. 
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To varying degrees companies choose to issue their own Environmental/Sustainability 
Reports in order to convey primarily non-financial information.  There is no standard reporting 
format for Environmental/Sustainability Reports and the types of actual disclosures vary from 
company to company and year to year. We examined discretionary environmental disclosure in 
corporate social responsibility reports, stand-alone environmental reports and sustainability 
reports.  The reports were accessed at socialfunds.com, CorporateRegister.com and on individual 
corporate websites.  We then classified the information according to the index items proposed by 
Clarkson et al. (2008) consistent with their described coding rules. Table 2 provides descriptive 
statistics for the scores on each of the index items for our sample. 
It should be noted that the Clarkson (2008) measure, and by extension the GRI 
framework, assumes that more disclosure indicates greater transparency and does not attempt to 
determine whether the disclosures represent either “good” or “bad” news.  
Control Variables in Equation (1) 
Market to Book  
The market-to-book ratio is a proxy for the firm's growth opportunities. It also provides a 
measure of the agency costs of debt because of the higher potential agency costs of debt in high 
growth firms (Myers, 1977). Therefore, firms expecting high future growth should use a greater 
amount of equity finance. There is also the possibility that the correlations may stem from 
perceived mispricing. If firms typically issue stock when their price is high relative to book value 
we might observe a negative correlation between the market-to-book ratio and leverage 
(Korajczk et al., 1990; Jung et al., 1994). 
Non-Debt Tax Shields   
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This variable is expected to be negatively related to leverage. The tax benefit of additional debt 
financing declines with the increase in non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). 
Tangibility  
Prior studies document a positive relation between asset tangibility and firm leverage (Titman 
and Wessels, 1988). If a large fraction of a firm's assets are tangible, then assets should serve as 
collateral and reduce the risk and agency costs of debt. Tangible assets should also retain value 
in liquidation. Therefore, the greater the proportion of tangible assets on the balance sheet the 
more willing lenders should be to supply loans, and leverage should be higher. 
log(Total Assets)  
The effect of size on leverage is ambiguous. Larger firms tend to be more diversified and fail less 
often, so size may be an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy and consequently should 
have a positive impact on the supply of debt. However, size may also be a proxy for the 
information available to outside investors, which should increase their preference for equity 
relative to debt (Frank and Goyal, 2009). 
Return on Assets  
Return on assets measures profitability. There are conflicting theoretical predictions on the 
effects of profitability on leverage. Myers and Majluf (1984) predict a negative relationship, 
because more profitable firms will prefer to finance with internal funds rather than debt. Jensen 
(1986) predicts a positive relationship if the market for corporate control is effective and forces 
firms to commit to paying out cash to stockholders by raising more debt, but the relationship 
would be negative if managers of profitable firms prefer to avoid the disciplinary role of debt.  
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Control Variables in Equation (2) 
Return on Assets  
Firms with superior earnings performance are more likely to disclose ‘‘good news’’ to financial 
markets (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Clarkson et al., 2008). 
Leverage  
Agency costs of debt are higher for firms with a larger proportion of debt in their capital 
structure, and these firms incur more monitoring costs (Jensen and Meckling (1976). Thus 
voluntary disclosure is expected to increase with debt. 
log(Total Assets) 
Larger firms benefit from economies of scale with respect to information and production costs 
and are likely to disclose more information (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Clarkson et al., 2008). 
 Newness  
Firms with newer equipment, with newer and less polluting technologies, are likely to have a 
superior environmental performance relatively to their industry peers. Accordingly, the firms 
will want to communicate that information to stakeholders through discretionary disclosures 
(Clarkson et al., 2008). 
Capital Intensity  
Firms with higher capital expenditures are investing in new equipment. These upgrades and 
investments should improve environmental efficiency, compelling increased voluntary 
disclosures (Clarkson et al., 2008). 
Financing 
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Firms that raise debt and equity capital have additional incentives to undertake voluntary 
disclosures to reduce the information asymmetry problem and lower their cost of capital (Healy 
and Palepu, 1993, 1995, Frankel et al., 1995, Clarkson et al., 2008). 
 
4.  Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample is comprised of companies in the electric utility (SIC 49) industry that file 
with reportable TRI emissions and have information available in the Compustat database 
between 2001 and 2007. This industry has been chosen for study for several reasons. First, 
electric companies are fairly homogeneous in terms of operations and the toxicity of chemicals 
emitted is comparable. Second, during the time period of interest, the electric industry has the 
second highest total TRI emissions and the highest air emissions and releases to on-site landfills. 
Third, U.S. electric companies have operations sited almost entirely in the United States.  
Finally, U.S. electric utilities are exposed to high environmental regulatory risks related to 
emissions. As such, their operations are subject to TRI reporting requirements and management 
strategy is influenced by a similar set of regulations, risks and disclosure requirements. Our final 
sample includes a total of 324 company/year observations and 47 companies.  
Table 2 presents the mean and median scores of our sample on the Clarkson et al. (2008) 
index items.  The scores are similar to those obtained in their sample.  Mean scores are highest 
for Category (A3) which represent “hard” disclosures relating to various types of emissions and 
resource usage.  Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. Companies in our sample 
have an average market value of equity of $7.9 billion and average sales of $6.5 billion. Market-
to-book varies between 1.33 (1st quartile) and 1.91 (3rd quartile) and Return on Assets varies 
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between 1.8% (1st quartile) and 3.6% (3rd quartile), providing evidence of homogeneity between 
the companies in our sample.  
 
 
5.  Results 
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between the variables included in our model. 
Leverage is negatively correlated with Market to Book, Non-Debt Tax Shield and Return on 
Assets, and positively correlated with log(Total Assets). As predicted, Leverage is positively 
correlated with Environmental Performance. The correlation coefficient between Leverage and 
Environmental Disclosure is negative.  
Table 5 presents the results of the multivariate regression analyses of disclosure on 
environmental performance and leverage (Equation 2) using OLS pooled cross-sectional time-
series regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.  In support of 
Hypothesis 2, the results show a significant relationship between CRLV and Environmental 
Performance in models 1 (t-stat.=-2.93, p<0.01), 2 (t-stat=-2.69, p<0.01) and 3 (t-stat=-
2.58,p<0.05) indicating that firms with better environmental performance provide more 
voluntary environmental information.  These results are consistent with Clarkson et al. (2008).  
Models 4 and 5 indicate that this significant relationship holds for both “hard” and “soft” 
disclosures.  This indicates that companies with better environmental performance disclose more 
objective and subjective information in their voluntary environmental reports. 
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  In all models, the coefficients on Leverage are negative and significant.  This does not 
support the agency cost theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and lends support to the argument 
of Schipper (1981) that firms maintain other, non-public avenues of disclosure with bondholders.  
Schipper (1981) is further supported by the significant and negative coefficients on Debt 
Financing in models 3, 4, and 5.  Firms that are issuing debt in the current reporting year provide 
less public environmental performance information.  The coefficients on Log(Total Assets) and 
Capital Intensity are significant and positive in all models, as expected.  Larger firms and those 
investing in new capital assets provide more performance information. 
In Table 6, in models 1 to 3 we present the results of the multivariate regression analyses 
of leverage on environmental performance and disclosure (Equation 1) using OLS pooled cross-
sectional time-series regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.  We 
present the estimated two-stage least squares (2SLS) simultaneous equation models defined by 
the structural equations (1) and (2) in models 4 - 6. The 2SLS equations were also estimated 
using pooled cross-sectional time-series regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. The OLS models 1 -3 show no significant relationship between Leverage and 
Environmental Performance.  However, the results reveal a positive and significant relationship 
between Leverage and Environmental Performance in the 2SLS models 4 (t-stat=-1.82, p<.10) 
and 6 (t-stat=-1.99, p<.10). These results support H1. Firms with better environmental 
performance have higher relative debt financing than firms with poorer performance when 
controlling for endogeneity. The results also show a negative and significant relationship 
between Leverage and Environmental Disclosure for all models. This result supports H3 and 
shows that, for our sample, firms with greater voluntary disclosure have lower debt financing. 
This result holds true for total disclosures as well as “hard” and “soft” disclosures. 
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6.  Conclusion 
This study investigates the effect of environmental performance and environmental 
disclosure on the capital structure of a company. Better environmental performance reduces the 
volatility of the firm’s cash flows, decreases potential bankruptcy costs and increases debt 
capacity. Environmental disclosure may decrease the agency costs of debt and reduce estimation 
or information risk.  
Using a sample of electric utility companies, our results show that environmental 
performance has a significant impact on leverage, after controlling for endogeneity. This result is 
consistent with the argument presented by Al-Tuwarijri et al. (2004) that environmental strategy 
is jointly determined by firms, and environmental performance and environmental reporting 
transparency must be examined simultaneously. Allowing for the potential endogeneity in the 
model makes a statistically significant difference in the results. The significance of the 
relationship between leverage and disclosure increased in the simultaneous equations models, 
when compared with the results obtained in the OLS models.  
We conclude that superior environmental performance has a positive impact on the 
proportion of debt financing in firms. The results also show a negative relationship between 
environmental disclosure and leverage. While voluntary disclosure may decrease agency costs of 
debt and increase debt capacity, our results suggest that the reduction in estimation or 
information risk appears to result in more reliance on equity financing.  The relationship between 
leverage and environmental disclosure may also result from the construct used to measure 
disclosure. The Clarkson et al. (2008) index is based on discretionary environmental reports that 
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may be targeted to the equity investors of the company. This result is also consistent with 
managers sharing private information with creditors (Zazerski, 1996) and writing explicit 
contracts (Schipper, 1981) as a means of reducing agency costs relating to debt.  
While previous papers have addressed the relationship between financial performance and 
environmental performance, or environmental performance and environmental disclosure, our 
paper uses an integrated approach to study the relationship between leverage and environmental 
performance and disclosure. This research furthers our understanding of how corporate 
environmental strategy is related to the firm’s financial strategy. 
Extensions to this study could include testing the model on samples in other industries with 
less exposure to regulatory risk and a lower proportion of U.S. based operations. In addition, the 
TRI is a single measure of environmental performance and may be more or less important to 
stakeholders depending on the industry (Connors et al., 2010). Future research should also 
consider alternative measures of environmental performance such as deforestation, greenhouse 
gas emissions, water use, and compliance with European Union REACH regulations. 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt, market value of equity and 
liquidating value of preferred stock at the end of the fiscal year. 
Environmental Performance Annual TRI emissions in pounds scaled by sales.   
Environmental Disclosure-CRLV  Environmental Disclosure Index proposed in Clarkson et al. (2008), 
constructed based on discretionary environmental reports released during the 
year. 
Environmental Disclosure- Hard Clarkson et al. (2008) Index categories (A1) – (A4). 
Environmental Disclosure- Soft Clarkson et al. (2008) Index categories (A5) – (A7). 
Market to Book Ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
Return on Assets Ratio of earnings before extraordinary items to total assets at the end of the 
fiscal year. 
log(Total Assets) Logarithm of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
Tangibility Ratio of net plant and equipment to total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
Non-Debt Tax Shields Ratio of depreciation and amortization to total assets at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
Newness Ratio of net property, plant and equipment divided by the gross property, plant 
and equipment at the end of the fiscal year. 
Capital Intensity Ratio of capital spending to total sales revenues. 
Financing Sale of common stock and preferred shares minus the purchase of common 
stock and preferred shares plus long term debt issuance minus long term debt 
reduction, scaled by the value of total assets at the end of the previous fiscal 
year. 
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Table 2. Environmental disclosure scores according to the classification items for the index of 
quality of discretionary disclosure proposed in Clarkson et al. (2008) 
  Mean Median SD 
Hard disclosures  
   
(A1) Governance structure and management systems     
1. Existence of a Department for pollution control and/or management positions for env. management (0–1) 0.698 1 0.46 
2. Existence of an environmental and/or a public issues committee in the board (0–1) 0.108 0 0.31 
3. Existence of terms and conditions applicable to suppliers and/or customers regarding env. practices (0–1) 0.145 0 0.35 
4. Stakeholder involvement in setting corporate environmental policies (0–1) 0.108 0 0.31 
5. Implementation of ISO14001 at the plant and/or firm level (0–1) 0.181 0 0.38 
6. Executive compensation is linked to environmental performance (0–1) 0.012 0 0.11 
(A2) Credibility     
1. Adoption of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines or provision of a CERES report (0–1) 0.325 0 0.47 
2. Independent verification/assurance about environmental information disclosed in the EP report/web (0–1) 0.012 0 0.11 
3. Periodic independent verifications/audits on environmental performance and/or systems (0–1) 0.217 0 0.41 
4. Certification of environmental programs by independent agencies (0–1) 0 0 0 
5. Product Certification with respect to environmental impact (0–1) 0 0 0 
6. External environmental performance awards and/or inclusion in a sustainability index (0–1) 0.493 0 0.5 
7. Stakeholder involvement in the environmental disclosure process  (0–1) 0.024 0 0.15 
8. Participation in voluntary environmental initiatives endorsed by EPA or Department of Energy (0–1) 0.578 1 0.5 
9. Participation in industry specific associations/initiatives to improve environmental practices (0–1) 0.421 0 0.49 
10. Participation in other environmental organizations/assoc. to improve. environmental practices  (0–1) 0.204 0 0.4 
(A3) Environmental performance indicators     
1. EPI on energy use and/or energy efficiency (0–6) 0.37 0 0.98 
2. EPI on water use and/or water use efficiency (0–6) 0.795 0 1.41 
3. EPI on green house gas emissions (0–6) 3.12 3 1.17 
4. EPI on other air emissions (0–6) 3.21 3 0.98 
5. EPI on TRI (land, water, air) (0–6) 1.53 2 1.49 
6. EPI on other discharges, releases and/or spills (not TRI) (0–6) 0.91 0 1.34 
7. EPI on waste generation and/or management (0–6) 1.86 2 1.42 
8. EPI on land and resources use, biodiversity and conservation (0–6) 0.12 0 0.45 
9. EPI on environmental impacts of products and services (0–6) 0 0 0 
10. EPI on compliance performance (e.g., exceedances, reportable incidents) (0–6) 1.66 2 1.41 
(A4) Environmental spending     
1. Summary of dollar savings arising from environment initiatives to the company (0-1)\ 0.12 0 0.33 
2. Amount spent on technologies, R& D and/or innovations to enhance environ. perf. and/or efficiency (0–1) 0.45 0 0.5 
3. Amount spent on fines related to environmental issues (0–1) 0.33 0 0.47 
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Table 2 (continued) 
  Mean Median SD 
Soft Disclosures  
   
(A5) Vision and strategy     
1. CEO statement on environmental performance in letter to shareholders and/or stakeholders (0–1) 0.759 1 0.43 
2. A statement of corporate environmental policy, values and principles, environ. codes of conduct (0–1) 0.566 1 0.49 
3. A statement about formal management systems regarding environmental risk and performance (0–1) 0.518 1 0.5 
4. A statement that the firm undertakes periodic reviews and evaluations of its environ. performance (0–1) 0.349 0 0.48 
5. A statement of measurable goals in terms of future env. Performance (if not awarded under A3) (0–1) 0.108 0 0.31 
6. A statement about specific environmental innovations and/or new technologies (0–1) 0.325 0 0.47 
(A6) Environmental profile     
1. A statement about the firm’s compliance (or lack thereof) with specific environmental standards (0–1) 0.24 0 0.43 
2. An overview of environmental impact of the industry (0–1) 0.108 0 0.31 
3. An overview of how the business operations and/or products and services impact the environment. (0–1) 0.49 1 0.5 
4. An overview of corporate environmental performance relative to industry peers (0–1) 0.048 0 0.215 
(A7) Environmental initiatives     
1. A substantive description of employee training in environmental management and operations (0–1) 0.133 0 0.34 
2. Existence of response plans in case of environmental accidents (0–1) 0.156 0 0.37 
3. Internal environmental awards (0–1) 0.108 0 0.32 
4. Internal environmental audits (0–1) 0.373 0 0.49 
5. Internal certification of environmental programs (0–1) 0.036 0 0.19 
6. Community involvement and/or donations related to environ. (if not awarded under A1.4 or A2.7) (0–1) 0.99 1 0.11 
 
The mean, median and standard deviation pertain to the observations in our sample. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
25th Perc. Median 75th Perc. 
Leverage 0.539 0.161 0.442 0.524 0.626 
Market to Book 1.747 0.924 1.335 1.591 1.906 
Return on Assets 0.024 0.026 0.018 0.028 0.036 
Log(Total Assets) 3.996 0.467 3.648 4.053 4.376 
Tangibility  0.951 0.058 0.918 0.976 1.000 
Non-Debt Tax Shields 0.034 0.008 0.029 0.033 0.039 
Newness 0.642 0.083 0.586 0.628 0.690 
Capital Intensity 0.148 0.079 0.094 0.133 0.186 
Financing 0.005 0.048 -0.019 0.006 0.033 
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Table 4. Correlation coefficients 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Environmental Performance 1.000 0.131 0.104 -0.190 -0.101 0.045 -0.067 -0.127 0.188 -0.166 
2. Environmental Disclosure 0.131 1.000 -0.159 0.095 0.112 0.192 0.067 -0.069 0.119 0.182 
3. Leverage 0.104 -0.159 1.000 -0.408 -0.579 0.212 -0.004 -0.253 -0.047 -0.120 
4. Market to Book -0.190 0.095 -0.408 1.000 0.327 0.096 0.063 0.045 0.014 0.052 
5. Return on Assets -0.101 0.112 -0.579 0.327 1.000 -0.098 -0.011 0.247 -0.158 0.169 
6. Log (Total Assets) 0.045 0.192 0.212 0.096 -0.098 1.000 -0.258 -0.256 0.231 -0.050 
7. Tangibility -0.067 0.067 -0.004 0.063 -0.011 -0.258 1.000 -0.115 0.011 0.222 
8. Non-debt Tax Shields -0.127 -0.069 -0.253 0.045 0.247 -0.256 -0.115 1.000 -0.322 0.069 
9. Newness 0.188 0.119 -0.047 0.014 -0.158 0.231 0.011 -0.322 1.000 0.044 
10.Capital Intensity -0.166 0.182 -0.120 0.052 0.169 -0.050 0.222 0.069 0.044 1.000 
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Table 5. Regressions of environmental disclosure on environmental performance and leverage 
    
Model 1 
CRLV 
Model 2 
CRLV 
Model 3 
CRLV 
Model 4 
Hard 
Model 5 
Soft 
Intercept  2.424 1.882 0.390 -8.838 -1.689 
  0.230 0.180 0.040 -0.870 -0.600 
       
Environmental Performance  -1.839 -1.730 -1.692 -0.858 -0.400 
  -2.930*** -2.680*** -2.580** -1.670* -2.550** 
       
Leverage  -13.615 -14.154 -12.250 -12.236 -3.509 
  -3.090*** -3.230*** -2.810*** -3.100*** -2.700*** 
       
Market to Book  0.160 0.086 0.329 -0.683 -0.018 
  0.240 0.120 0.480 -1.360 -0.080 
       
Return on Assets  -4.978 -0.059 -1.820 -4.095 -0.136 
  -0.250 0.000 -0.090 -0.200 -0.020 
       
Log(Total Assets)  4.977 4.846 5.092 6.817 1.953 
  2.990*** 2.920*** 3.090*** 4.310*** 5.070*** 
       
Newness  -2.274 -1.031 -2.246 -1.958 -0.717 
  -0.270 -0.120 -0.270 -0.250 -0.310 
       
Capital Intensity  30.980 31.590 32.460 22.809 7.449 
  2.100** 2.220** 2.240** 2.030** 2.150** 
       
Financing  5.191     
  0.680     
       
Equity Financing   -35.756    
   -0.980    
       
Debt Financing    -15.892 -21.530 -6.104 
    -1.620* -2.700*** -2.600*** 
       
R^2  0.168 0.167 0.169 0.198 0.195 
F-STAT  4.200 3.860 3.480 5.190 6.700 
N   324 324 324 324 324 
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient in italic. The significance levels for the independent variables are 
given by: *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10.  All models are estimated using pooled cross-sectional time-
series regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.  See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 6. Two-stage Least Squares regressions.  (Dependent variable = Leverage) 
 Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Sign OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Intercept  0.271 0.199 0.233 -0.443 -1.112 -0.997 
  1.080 0.810 0.940 -0.820 -1.720* -1.910* 
     
   
Environmental 
Performance (+) 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.035 -0.025 -0.039 
  0.400 0.430 0.340 -1.820* -1.460 -1.990* 
     
   
CRLV Index (±) -0.002   -0.025   
  -2.590**   -2.950***   
     
   
CRLV Hard   -0.003   -0.034  
   -3.110***   -3.650***  
        
CRLV Soft    -0.008   -0.110 
    -2.680**   -3.510*** 
        
Market to Book (−) -0.054 -0.057 -0.055 -0.035 -0.070 -0.045 
  
-1.790* -1.880* -1.830* -1.390 -2.650** -1.440 
     
   
Return on Assets (±) -2.634 -2.568 -2.613 -1.103 -0.732 -0.869 
  -3.930*** -3.840*** -3.910*** -1.650 -1.020 -1.230 
     
   
Log(Total Assets) (+) 0.075 0.087 0.082 0.194 0.300 0.286 
  2.460** 2.930*** 2.690*** 3.410*** 4.060*** 4.360*** 
     
   
Tangibility (+) 0.175 0.210 0.190 0.787 1.049 1.008 
  0.980 1.210 1.100 2.040** 2.350** 2.770*** 
     
   
Non-Debt Tax 
Shields (−) -1.590 -1.521 -1.455 -2.610 -1.662 -0.487 
  -1.140 -1.090 -1.040 -0.930 -0.550 -0.150 
     
   
R^2  0.450 0.463 0.454 
   
F-statistic  11.69 12.1 11.82 7.67 6.7 7.58 
N   324 324 324 324 324 324 
 
t-statistics are reported below each coefficient in italic. The significance levels for the independent variables are 
given by: *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10.  All models are estimated using pooled cross-sectional time-
series regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.  See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
 
